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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Cross Appellants Maj-Le Bridges and Harold A. Bridges appeal the District Court's
denial of their creatively captioned "Motion for Order to Prevent IFB's Untimely Arbitration
Demand and to Confirm Debt on Cabin Note is Extinguished and Not Recoverable from Any
Assets." As set forth in Appellant Idaho First Bank's original appeal, the District Court granted
summary judgment against Idaho First's claim for deficiency under its 2006 loan to the Bridges,
finding that the Valley County collateral was real property and Idaho First' s claim was untimely
under I.C. § 45-1512. After that ruling, Idaho First brought an arbitration proceeding against the
Bridges to foreclose upon separate property in Ada County, 1 not Valley County, granted as
collateral on a separate loan in 2008. The collateral instrument for the later 2008 loan contains a
cross-collateralization clause providing that the Ada County property secured not only the loan
consummated at the time, but any other debts the Bridges may owe Idaho First as a lender.
After all claims had been dismissed before the District Court, the Bridges' motion asked
the Court to block the arbitration proceeding and to rule that the remaining balance of the 2006
loan was extinguished and uncollectable by any means, including resort to different collateral.
The Court had little difficulty in denying this unusual motion, finding it did not have jurisdiction

Likely because of a clerical error, the title page to the Bridges Brief entitled "Joint
Respondents' and Cross-Appellants' Brief' indicates that this appeal is from the District Court of
the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, "In and For the County of Ada." This is
incorrect. The proceeding below was always pursued and defended in Valley County regarding
the improvements the Bridges constructed on state lease land in Valley County and the relevant
2006 loan documents.
- 1-

under I.A.R. l 3(b) once the appeal was filed. It found it did not have jurisdiction for reopening
the action to decide whether the Bridges were entitled to an additional measure ofrelief they did
not seek, a declaratory judgment that the remaining balance of the 2006 loan was extinguished.
Even if there were no jurisdictional impediment, the Court indicated it would not grant the
motion, finding no waiver of the cross-collateralization clause or the right to arbitration.
Finally, because the combined appeal raised so many issues relevant to the arbitration
under Idaho law, the arbitrator stayed Idaho First's arbitration to determine what, if any, effect a
decision by this Court might have upon the arbitration.

B.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings

Idaho First incorporates Section LB. of Appellant's Opening Brief, but adds the
following:
On September 21, 2006, the Bridges obtained a loan from Idaho First for $1,500,000.00
under a Promissory Note. R., pp. 11-12; R., p. 73,, 9; R., p. 82,, 9. The Promissory Note was
secured by a Construction Deed of Trust. R., pp. 108-117. Defendants constructed an
approximately 5,000 square foot structure constructed on the Valley County state lease land. R.,
p. 83,, 13. This original Promissory Note and Construction Deed of Trust are referred to as the
"First Loan Transaction" or, as the District Court preferred, "the 2006 loan."
To complete construction, on January 3, 2008, the Bridges requested a second loan from
Idaho First for $150,000.00. This second loan was made under a Credit Agreement and
Disclosure (R., pp. 871-876) and a second Deed of Trust encumbering different real property
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Defendants owned in Ada County, Idaho. R., pp. 878-886. This indebtedness and related
documents are referred to as the "Second Loan Transaction" or "the 2008 loan."
The Deed of Trust for the 2008 loan encumbering the Ada County property provides in
part:
In addition to the Credit Agreement, this Deed of Trust secures all obligations,
debts and liabilities, plus interest thereon, of Grantor to Lender, or any one or
more of them, as well as all claims by Lender against Gran tor or any one or more
of them, whether now existing or hereafter arising, whether related or unrelated to
the purpose of the Credit Agreement, whether voluntary or otherwise, whether
due or not due, direct or indirect, determined or undetermined, absolute or
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, whether Grantor may be liable individually
or jointly with others, whether obligated as guarantor, surety, accommodation
party or otherwise, and whether recovery upon such amounts may be or
hereafter may become barred by any statute of limitations, and whether the
obligation to repay such amounts may be or hereafter may become otherwise
unenforceable. (emphasis added)
R., p. 878. Defendants not only executed this Deed of Trust, they initialed this specific
paragraph. Id.
After ruling against Idaho First in its effort to recover a deficiency under Article 9 or
LC.§ 45-1512, the District Court entered Judgment, which dismissed Idaho First's second
amended complaint in its entirety "with no award ofrelief to Idaho First Bank." R., p. 848. On
August 1, 2016, the District Court entered its Order denying Idaho First's motion to reconsider.
R., pp. 822-825. At no time had the Bridges asserted any counterclaim. Idaho First filed a
timely Notice of Appeal on September 8, 2016. R., pp. 827-31.
On October 6, 2016, Idaho First filed a Demand for Arbitration with the American
Arbitration Association according to the terms of the Deed of Trust for the Second Loan
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Transaction or 2008 loan, seeking all amounts owed by the Bridges to Idaho First, including the
full amounts due under the Promissory Note for the 2006 loan. R., pp. 891-96.
Then, on October 21, 2016, the Bridges filed their "Motion for Order to Prevent IFB' s
Untimely Arbitration Demand and to Confirm Debt on Cabin Note is Extinguished and Not
Recoverable from Any Assets." R., pp. 851-52. This Motion asked the Court to
(1) permanently prevent Idaho First Bank's efforts to change the forum and
pursue arbitration, and (2) clarify that this Court's rulings cannot be collaterally
attacked through a foreclosure of the 2008 Deed of Trust, the debt owed under the
2006 Cain Note has been fully extinguished, and/or no further collection can be
pursued regarding that debt.
Id. The Bridges attempted to invoke I.A.R. 13(b)(6) or (13) and I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l) or (6).

The District Court had no difficulty denying Respondents' motion for further relief after
the case was dismissed. In its written Order, District Court stated:
The Court sees no justification for reopening this action to litigate whether the
Bridges are entitled to an additional measure ofrelief they didn't seek: a
declaratory judgment that the remaining balance of the 2006 loan is extinguished
and not collectable by resort to collateral other than the McCall cabin.
(emphasis added)
R., p. 960.
Inquiring of the Bridges' counsel at oral argument, the District Court asked:
Now, I haven't technically adjudicated an issue like that. I haven't
answered the question, is this debt extinguished or is it merely not collectible by
recourse to a deficiency claim following the sale of the cabin deed of trust
collateral.
Given that - what authorizes me to expand the issues I've adjudicated - I
mean, adjudicated in what I needed to adjudicate to determine whether the claims
were viable. Now, if the bank has a separate theory or a separate collateral
instrument on which it might be able to recover the same amount, why is it again
that that is an issue that ought to be adjudicated on a post judgment basis in this
-4-

case as opposed to in some separate proceeding whether it's in the arbitration or a
new lawsuit that challenges the arbitration?" 2
(emphasis added)
After counsel tried to answer this compelling question, the Court commented:
Well, I guess I might quibble with that. Because I think what they lost on
was the idea that the deficiency balance was collectible under Idaho Code Section
45-1525, or whatever the [statute] is, if I've got the cite right. Or in this case also,
if they had a UCCC deficiency claim, and I ruled that they didn't have a UCC
deficiency claim because there was no personal property collateral. And I ruled
that Idaho Code 4 5-1512 deficiency claim was time-barred.
Now, that's a separate issue from whether the debt is extinguished or
whether it's still lingering but just not actionable. And given that I didn't need to
resolve the extinguishment issue in order to adjudicate the claim presented - I
mean, I don't' know, I'm struggling with how the upshot of my ruling is - my
existing ruling can be that the debt is definitively extinguished.
Tr., pp. 14-15, II. 23-25; 1-17.
In its ruling on the record at hearing, the Court clearly identified the reasoning behind its
refusal to grant Respondents' motion:
That's (the extinguishment issue) a legal question that didn't prove to be
necessary to address in order to address the claims the bank made. So once the
court's judgment is entered, there was a calculable deficiency that was determined
not to be collectible on these legal theories but no determination made as to
whether it was still [extant] debt or not.
Now, the parties plainly have a dispute about whether it is or isn't an
[extant] debt, but resolving that, as I said, wasn't part ofresolving this case. It
wasn't necessary to this case. It only - the question only arises in the context of
the bank's effort to try to collect the debt through recourse to other collateral,

Transcript of Proceedings of December 5, 2016, pp. 3-4, II. 11-25; 1-3. Subsequent
references to this Transcript are cited as Tr. followed by page and line numbers in accordance
with I.A.R. 35(e).
2
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namely the Bridges' 200 - the Bridges' home in Boise which they pledged as
collateral securing a loan made on the 2008 home as collateral but also pledged when they entered into that agreement, the home they pledged for that loan was
also made collateral through a cross-collateralization provision for the note on the
cabin.
Now, the Idaho Supreme Court recently had occasion to address the
subject of whether a debt barred by the statute of limitations can nevertheless be
collected through recourse to collateral. That case was Sallaz v. Rice. The
opinion was issued on November 23. The court held that it could.
Now, this wasn't a deficiency claim. It didn't involve Idaho Code Section
45-1512, but it held that when collecting a debt becomes time-barred, as I held
this debt in this case had become, that doesn't mean a creditor who has collateral
is somehow estopped or barred from foreclosing on the collateral as a means of
collecting the debt.
So it is I think possible that once the merits are reached, that this concept
would permit the bank to do what it is purporting to do or wanting to do.
(emphasis added)
Tr., pp. 31-32, 11. 5-25; 1-20.
In its subsequent written Order denying the same motion, the District Court amplified its
conclusions particularly as to jurisdiction. The District Court noted that it lacked "unfettered
jurisdiction" over the action, because of the dismissal and pending appeal, and was limited under
I.A.R. l 3(b ). R., p. 959. The Bridges' claim that I.A.R. l 3(b )( 6)' s grant of jurisdiction to decide
motions made under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l) or 60(b)(6) was mistaken: there was simply no "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b )( 1) that justified any relief to the
Bridges from judgment, nor "any other reason that justifies relief' under Rule 60(b)(6). As the
District Court emphasized, "(i]ndeed, the judgment awarded them [the Bridges] complete relief:
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complete dismissal ofldaho First Bank's deficiency claims with prejudice." R., pp. 959-60. The
District Court concluded:
The Court sees no justification for reopening this action to litigate whether the
Bridges are entitled to an additional measure of relief they didn't seek: a
declaratory judgment that the remaining balance of the 2006 loan is extinguished
and not collectable by resort to collateral other than the McCall cabin.
R., p. 960.

Next, the Court rejected the Bridges' contention that the arbitration proceeding was an
attempt to subvert the judgment in this action: "the arbitration proceeding Idaho First Bank
subsequently commenced isn't an attempt to relitigate its deficiency claims. Instead, it's an
attempt to collect the remaining balance of the 2006 loan by resort to collateral other than that
which was at issue in this action." R., p. 960. The Bridges were seeking an unjustifiable
expansion of the District Court's prior judgment, not its enforcement. Id. Finally, the Court
rejected the Bridges' waiver argument and indicated that even if there were no jurisdictional
impediment to grant the Bridges' requested relief, it would not do so. It was up to the arbitration
proceeding to determine any issues surrounding cross-collateralization and "whether Idaho First
Bank has the right to collect the remaining balance of the 2006 loan through resort to the
collateral for the 2008 loan." Id.
The Bridges filed a cross-appeal of the denial of this motion. R., pp. 963-70. Because of
the possibility that a decision in this appeal regarding Idaho law could affect issues in the
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arbitration and based on Respondents' unrealistic estimates of the time involved in this appeal,
the arbitrator stayed the arbitration pending a decision from this Court. 3

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS- APPEAL
1. Whether the District Court's denial of the Bridges' motion was properly entered due

to lack of jurisdiction.
2. Whether the District Court's denial of the Bridges' motion was properly entered due
to the pendency of the arbitration and its inability to interfere with that proceeding.

III.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Idaho First denies that the Bridges are entitled to attorney fees on appeal, in part because

this entire appeal involves a transaction for personal or household purposes under I.C. § 12120(3), not a "commercial transaction" under Idaho law. The Bridges have failed to provide
"facts, authority, and argument supporting the claim that the case involves a 'commercial
transaction' and that such transaction is the gravamen of the lawsuit." See, e.g.,

Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 370, 79 P.3d 723, 729 (2003); Poledna v. Idaho DOL, 158
Idaho 372,375,347 P.3d 1186, 1189 (2015).

IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL
Idaho First submits this Court may exercise free review over the questions of law in this

cross-appeal.

See, Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Request for Judicial Notice of
Filings in Related Arbitration, filed July 18, 2017, ~rs 8-11.
-8-

V.

ARGUMENT
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT IT DID NOT
HA VE JURISDICTION TO GRANT THE BRIDGES' REQUESTED
RELIEF AND INTERFERE WITH THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDING.
1.

The Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act allows only limited judicial
involvement in arbitration proceedings.

With a full-throated endorsement of arbitration, Section 7-901, Idaho Code, provides in

[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a
provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter
arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (emphasis
added)
Similarly, Section 7-902(a) provides that the sole grounds to stay an arbitration is if the opposing
party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate. Here, the Bridges have not done so.
Likewise, an order compelling arbitration shall not be refused because the claim in issue "lacks
merit or bona fides or because any fault or grounds of the claim sought to be arbitrated have not
been shown," under Section 7-902(e). This is the actual basis for the Bridges' claims, but they
attempt to invoke other rules, knowing they cannot overcome 7-902(e), as argued below.
After arbitration, a court's power to vacate an award is limited to where an award was
procured by "corruption, fraud or other undue means (Section 7-912(1)); evident partiality or

The arbitration provision at issue makes explicit reference to the Federal Arbitration Act.
Regardless of which act applies, the analysis is the same. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 4 (providing that
courts shall order arbitration unless the agreement for arbitration is at issue).
4
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corruption or misconduct (Section 7-912(2)); and other equally exceptional circumstances
(Section 7-912(3 )-( 5)). 5
Within this context the Court must evaluate the Bridges' remarkable assignments of error
to the District Court.
2.

The District Court properly decided it did not have jurisdiction under
I.A.R. 13.

At Section VI.B. l. of Respondents' Brief, without a single citation to authority, the
Bridges claim "it difficult to understand how the District Court would lack 'inherent'
jurisdiction" to grant them relief. Respondents' Brief, p. 40. What the Bridges refuse to
acknowledge is that I.A.R. 13(b)(6) and its incorporation of I.R.C.P. 60(b) provides limited
jurisdiction after dismissal and pending appeal. As the District Court noted, they pointed to no
specific "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b)(l). It was the
Bridges who had prevailed entirely on the second amended complaint. Nor had they shown any
"other reason that justifies relief' under Rule 60(b)(6), for they were not asking relief from the
judgment. The judgment was entirely in their favor on the issues decided. These rules do not
grant free-floating jurisdiction to a district court to hear additional issues and grant further relief.
Rather weakly, the Bridges claimed earlier that they were seeking to vacate the final
judgment below to "clarify" the District Court's rulings and orders so Idaho First could not
pursue arbitration or raise certain legal arguments in arbitration. R., p. 857. The District Court's

Very similar provisions appear in the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § lO(a)(l)- (4).

- l O-

ruling on the deficiency claims were clear. In part, what the Bridges were inviting the District
Court to do was to further opine and advise another forum about the res judicata effects and
other significance of its own ruling. The District Court properly understood it did not have
jurisdiction to do so, noting that the Bridges were actually seeking something they had never
asked for - a declaratory judgment that their deficiency was forever extinguished even as to
separate collateral under a separate instrument. R., p. 960.
3.

Neither the District Court nor this Court has jurisdiction to issue
advisory opinions to a different tribunal about the legal effect of
rulings.

Although the Bridges would dearly love this Court to instruct the Arbitrator they win as
to cross-collateralization in the Arbitration, this Court may not do so, just as the District Court
declin~d to do so. First, the legal effect of the cross-collateralization clause in the second Deed
of Trust only arose once Idaho First decided to foreclose on the Ada County property. Its import
and effect were not before the District Court regarding the McCall property. Doubtless, the
Bridges will argue in the arbitration that, because of this Court's prior rulings, Idaho First has no
claim arising under the 2006 loan, despite the cross-collateralization provision. They will make
all of the claim preclusion arguments in section VI.B.2 of Respondent's Brief. Idaho First will
argue that the cross-collateralization clause rescues the claim because of its explicit language
that, as part of a new credit extension, it is collectible regardless of any ruling that it is barred by
a limitations period or is otherwise unenforceable. This will form one significant issue for the
Arbitrator -- one not properly before this Court or the District Court.
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Courts are not generally empowered to issue advisory opinions. See, e.g., Taylor v. AJA
Servs. Corp., 151 Idaho 552,569,261 P.3d 829,846 (2011); MDS Invs., LLC v. State, 138 Idaho

456, 465, 65 P.3d 197, 206 (2003); see also, Brown & Root Braun v. Bogan Inc., 54 F. App'x
542, 552 (3d Cir. 2002) (unpublished) ("Additionally, Sun asks us to proclaim that res judicata
does not apply to its claims against Home in New York state court. The effect of our ruling to
vacate the November 7, 2000 Order on the doctrine of res judicata in Sun's proceedings against
Home in another court is a matter beyond our power to declare. Any holding about the res
judicata effect of this ruling in another court would be an impermissible advisory opinion");
Deep v. Boies, 493 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D. Me. 2007) ("Rendering an opinion on the effect of my

order on a proceeding before a New York state court would be an impermissible advisory
opinion").
This Court should decline the Bridges' invitation to advise on what an arbitrator should
find as to claim preclusion, waiver or as to the purported extinguishment of their remaining
obligations under the 2006 promissory note. These issues were never before the District Court
and are not before this Court now. The Bridges do not invoke jurisdiction by raising late
arguments below. Even the styling of the Bridges' argument demonstrates its inappropriateness.
At Section IV.C.2. the Bridges entitle this section "This Court Should Dismiss IFB's CrossCollateralization Argument." Respondents' Brief, p. 48. The Bridges ask this Court to
"dismiss" an "argument" that Idaho First will make to the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding.
The District Court saw through the Bridges' attempts to invite it to provide relief they
had not asked for. Despite the many times the Bridges repeat that Idaho First is trying to
- 12 -

"undermine" the District Court's ruling, 6 the District Court even opined that Idaho First's
position on cross-collateralization would likely succeed. Tr., p. 32, 11. 17-20. The District Court
properly understood that its limited ruling based on the actual claims asserted by the parties was
that the McCall collateral constituted real property, that Idaho First had to follow LC.§ 45-1512
under the 2006 Deed of Trust and had not done so. Whether a later instrument like the 2008
Deed of Trust and its cross-collateralization provision were effective in making all amounts due
through resort to different collateral was never properly before the District Court. 7 The Bridges
sought no affirmative relief, including any declaration that their debt was "extinguished." This
Court does not properly have before it the myriad reasons the Bridges now want it to assert t that
the cross-collateralization provision is ineffective.
4.

Regardless, the Cross-Collateralization provision is effective.

The Bridges argue that they should be allowed to avoid payment of any further amounts
due on their 2006 loan and retain their windfall because the cross-collateralization provision in
the second Deed of Trust is "void." Respondents' Brief, p. 50. After citing general Idaho case
authority that illegal contracts will not be enforced, Defendants immediately tum to North
Dakota and other jurisdictions claiming that anti-deficiency statutes may not be waived. First,

See, e.g., Respondents' Brief, p. 53 ("For all the above reasons, IFB's argument to
undermine the District Court's prior ruling dismissing the deficiency action should be rejected").

6

Despite their current arguments, counsel for the Bridges conceded that Idaho First was
not obligated to pursue the 2008 collateral at the same time or within the same action as its
collection efforts as to the 2006 loan. Tr., p. 9, 11. 15-19.
- 13 -

Idaho has no similar "anti-deficiency" statute and no similarly announced public policy against
deficiency claims. While some jurisdictions, such as North Dakota disfavor deficiency claims,
Idaho does not. The cases cited by Defendants involve a contemporaneous waiver of deficiency
upon obtaining a loan. What is involved here is a waiver of deficiency as consideration for
obtaining a second, additional loan. Defendants were free to seek another lender who would not
require such a waiver, but instead entered into a knowing, explicit waiver of any deficiency
claim as to the earlier loan. 8
Similarly, the Bridges rely on cases from other jurisdictions stating that parties may not
pre-waive a statute of limitations period in an original contract. Here, Bridges waived such an
objection in a second, later contract, when they affirmatively sought new loan monies. Such
waivers are routinely enforced. See, e.g., Shupe v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 566 F. App'x 476,
482 (6th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) ("Waivers of statutes oflimitations are valid and enforceable
under Kentucky law"); United States v. Am. Gas Screw Franz Joseph, 210 F. Supp. 581,584 (D.
Alaska 1962) ("Here we have a situation where the parties, by a solemn writing, agreed to waive
the statute of limitations. The preferred mortgage dated the 15th day of June, 1949, specifically
refers to the said financing agreement. Under California law, the waiver in writing of the statute
oflimitations is valid and enforceable ... Under the law of that state a waiver even to the extent of

Defendants attempt to suggest that their waiver was not "knowing and voluntary"
because the "cross-collateralization provision says nothing about the anti-deficiency statute."
Respondents' Brief, p. 53. This is not a serious argument. As noted above, the crosscollateralization provision addresses explicitly the specific procedural protection afforded by
Section 45-1512, Idaho Code: that a deficiency claim should be brought within a specified time.
- 14 -

99 years is enforceable .... An unlimited waiver, such as we have in this case, is valid.")
(citations omitted).
Finally, the Bridges argue that, because they characterize Section 45-1512, Idaho Code,
as a statute of repose, 9 rather than a statute of limitations, the language of the crosscollateralization is not applicable. Apparently, although unclear, Defendants claim this result
because the provision explicitly mentions "any statute oflimitations" and does not set explicitly
the magic words "statute ofrepose." Again, this one-sentence argument is not serious, for even
the Bridges note that the provision secures Idaho First's right to elect all obligations, debts and
liabilities, whether "the obligation to repay such amounts ... may become unenforceable." This
result obtains whether because of a statute of repose or any other reason.
Even if the subject were properly before the District Court below or before this Court on
appeal, the Bridges' attempts to erase the cross-collateralization provision from application are
unavailing

VI.

CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above, Idaho First respectfully requests this Court affirm the

District Court's denial of Cross-Appellant's "Motion for Order to Prevent IFB 's Untimely
Arbitration Demand and to Confirm Debt on Cabin Note is Extinguished and Not Recoverable
from Any Assets."

9

It is not, as argued in Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 32.
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